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TRAJECTORIES OF THE COMMON MAN’S PARTY
November 3, 2014
“Mr. Ambani, you are one of the richest persons in this country where majority
of the population does not get to eat two square meals in a day. Does your
greed for money know no end? Why do you have to indulge in illegal activities
to make money when you can do good business without such activities?”
Those are the words of Prashant Bhushan, member of the national executive of
India’s Aam Aadmi Party (AAP)—Common Man’s Party—in an open letter (dated 23
July 2014) to Anil Ambani, chairman of the Reliance Group and potentially the
richest man in India if it weren’t for his brother Mukesh Ambani, worth $20 billion
and famous for having built Antilia, the world’s most expensive personal residen‐
tial property that towers over Mumbai’s squalor almost as a symbol of “the suc‐
cession of the middle and upper classes into outer space” (Roy 2012). Prashant is
clearly walking a tightrope: he is invoking outrage at the contrast between the
wealth of the Ambani brothers and the poverty in which most ordinary Indians live
but is keen to temper his criticism to target only the wealth that has been “ille‐
gally” made and that is evidence of excessive “greed.” “Crony capitalism” and “cor‐
ruption” are the vices that the AAP has set itself the task of combating, in favor of
“good business,” proper and legal capitalism. Like any populist party, AAP leaders
tend to avoid too explicitly leftist or rightist rhetoric, instead holding the two to‐
gether in often-uneasy tension.
Predictably, then, the populist ambiguity of the party has split  opinions among
critical scholars of India between those who insist on the need to think with the
AAP as an emerging popular-leftist or subaltern breakthrough into the status quo
of Indian politics  (e.g.,  Menon and Nigam 2011;  Nigam 2014;  Singh 2014;  Vis‐
vanathan 2014; Zabiliute 2014a—hesitantly, also Chakrabarti and Dhar 2014 and
even Giri 2014) and those who criticize it as a party heavily dominated by elite ur‐
ban “middle-class,” as well as upper-caste and male, concerns and hence implic‐
itly  right-wing (see Baxi  2014; Chatterjee 2011;  Illaiah 2014; Patnaik 2014;  Roy
2014; Sharma 2012; Sonpimple 2014). Most academic commentators—myself here
included—base their impressions of the AAP on news reports, election statistics,
and social media discussions combined with brief observations of the AAP in ac‐
tion as it  happens to emerge in their  ﬁeld sites or personal surroundings. Srila
Roy’s Economic and Political Weekly article “Being the change” (2014) stands out
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as the ﬁrst actual ethnographic account of the AAP. What Roy and most scholarly
commentators  I’ve read share,  however,  is  a  focus on the most  visible,  urban,
“middle-class” face of the AAP. The focus on the “middle-class” face of the AAP is
logical, perhaps, as this is where the party’s origins lie in Delhi. In the run-up to the
2014 national elections, however, the AAP formed a new alliance that resulted in
the active involvement of leaders of some of the most inﬂuential “people’s move‐
ments” and rural nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in India. This develop‐
ment has received little attention from academic commentators but happens to
have been quite visible to me as I was in contact with some of these NGO/peo‐
ple’s movement leaders as a result of ﬁeldwork on Dalit civil society activism in
South India.
Taking this “people’s movements” trajectory in the AAP into account, as I intend to
do in this short paper, lends some support to unsettling views of the AAP as pre‐
dominantly “middle-class,” and essentially rightist, in character. For whereas for
instance Facebook discussions of the AAP’s anti–money laundering campaigns,
such as Bhushan’s complaint against Anil Ambani, are full of frustrated engineer‐
ing  students  bemoaning  why  Indian  companies  cannot  act  like  great  philan‐
thropic,  employment-and-wealth-creating  companies  such  as  Google  or  Mi‐
crosoft, one gets a very different interpretation of the issue from someone like
Christina Swamy, another member of the national executive of the AAP and for‐
merly the program coordinator of a rural development NGO in Tamil Nadu. In my
interview with her,  Christina was keen to emphasize the outlandish amount of
money stacked away by Indian politicians in Swiss bank accounts and compare it
to what this could have meant for the average citizen: “Imagine…it’s bigger than a
year’s country budget! And from where they got this money? It is all  from the
people.” Hence whereas the “middle classes” (mostly an ideological category) are
concerned with emphasizing the essential goodness of capitalism if only it would
get rid of its corrupt excesses in India—corruption and commonness deﬁned as
moral trespassing and abnormalcy—Swamy is more concerned with criticizing the
huge disparities in wealth that have led to the impoverishment of large sections of
the Indian population: corruption deﬁned as theft from the people and common‐
ness as referring to the impoverished and excluded masses. To give due attention
to this second tendency within the AAP, then, I will in the following discuss the
two broad currents—that of the “middle class” and that of the “people’s move‐
ments”—in more detail, sketching their underlying class trajectories, their immedi‐
ate political predecessors, and their typical political style and ideological perspec‐
tive. I’ll end the paper, then, with a few reﬂections on the effect of the NGOs/peo‐
ple’s movements joining the AAP, ﬁrst on the AAP itself and second in light of po‐  
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litical hegemony in India more generally.
The “miiddle-class” trajjectory
There is a lot to be said about the “empty sign of the middle-class” (Kalb 2014), but
this is not the place. Let me emphasize merely that in designating the initial trajec‐
tory of the AAP as “middle-class,” I am not referring primarily to a sociological or
statistical reality but to an emic marker of identiﬁcation and ideology. For suﬃce
to say that with ongoing neoliberal statistical tinkering, ever-larger portions of the
Indian population are falling into this middle class while ideologically (as I use it
here) it actually stands for everything these petty street vendors, slum dwellers,
rickshaw drivers,  and marginal  peasants  are  deemed not  to  be:  educated  and
technologically savvy, non-opportunistic, and capable of sacriﬁce, cosmopolitan
but temperate in their consumption practices.
Key to sketching the historical context of this “middle-class” current within the
AAP is  the  demise  of  the developmental  state  in  India.  Where the largely  up‐
per-caste middle class of the post-Independence period was bolstered by sus‐
tained government investment in higher education and civil service employment,
this  gradually  started  to  change  from  the  1960s.  Lower  castes  attained  an
ever-stronger presence in the political ﬁeld, in higher educational institutions, and
in government bureaucracy, prompting this “middle class” to rally against govern‐
ment “reservation” policies (aﬃrmative action for lower castes) and to start con‐
sidering politics as a plebeian ﬁeld of unprincipled pragmatism, corruption, and
greed (Jaffrelot 2003). Many members of this middle class migrated to the United
Kingdom and the United States, from where they, however, remained heavily in‐
vested in domestic politics in India—including in the AAP (Roy 2014: 49). As these
processes intensiﬁed during the 1980s and GDP growth took off with the liberal‐
ization policies of the early ’90s, the “middle class,” then, became further pitted
against the Indian state, which it started to consider an obstacle on the way to en‐
richment through private sector employment and the neoliberal promise of “Shin‐
ing India” (Khandekar and Reddy 2014:5).
This is the broad-brush historical background to the immediate predecessor of
the AAP, namely the Anna Hazare craze that had Delhi in its spell in the summer of
2011. The Anna Hazare movement had strongly reactionary elements to it—for in‐
stance, the Youth for Equality mobilization that in name of meritocracy and, in‐
deed, anticorruption, and in a mode of hysterical upper-caste self-pity, agitates
against  reservations  for  Dalits  and lower  castes  in  education and civil  service.
However, in the months preceding the summer of 2011, a number of shockingly
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related to the action of mobile frequencies and the Commonwealth Games Scam
among them—came to light and, with this, an initiative called “India Against Cor‐
ruption”  could  shift  middle-class  anger  more  decidedly  toward  the  super-rich
(rather than toward Dalits and backward castes).  “Team Anna,” as the group of
people around Anna Hazare came to be known, channeled the shock at the scale
of these scams into an angry resentment with corrupt politicians and all-out re‐
jection of politics. A key member of Team Anna was Arvind Kejriwal—earlier, in
fact, also a prominent Youth for Equality leader—who later went on to found the
AAP. Indeed, if “Anna” (“father”) Hazare, an old Gandhian from Maharashtra with an
incorruptible,  ethical  reputation,  was  the  public  face  of  the  well-oiled  and
well-funded campaign, it was generally considered that Kejriwal, a one-time In‐
dian  Revenue  Service  oﬃcer-turned-civic-activist,  was  the  “brains”  behind  the
Anna Hazare campaign. What struck me when, in that summer of 2011, I visited
the Ramlila  Ground where Anna was doing his  symbolic public hunger fast  to
pressure the Indian government into adopting an anticorruption Citizen’s  Om‐
budsman bill,  was how much these grounds, where literally hundreds of thou‐
sands of people passed, felt like a combination of a professionally run mega-festi‐
val—complete with fenced queuing and X-ray screening of visitors’ bags—and a
media spectacle, where TV channels had their roaring generators, spotlights, and
glamorous journalists set up to broadcast nonstop, live from Ramlila. This was not
your typical unruly Indian popular festival—indeed, the “professionalism” was pal‐
pable everywhere from the campaign slogans that seemed to be taken straight
from the global advertising world (“I am Anna” the most prominent one)—to the
Anna merchandise and of course the sea of disposable white Gandhi topis offered
to visitors to wear.
The issue over which Kejriwal split with Anna at the end of the Anna Hazare cam‐
paign was supposedly over the question of whether to become “political.”  The
message of the Anna Hazare movement had been that all politics was dirty and
that only a parallel legal structure could restore India’s ethical reputation. Kejriwal
hardly  opposed  this  message  but  indeed  claimed  that  the  AAP  would  be  an
anti-system party; it would, in his words “look like a political party but not behave
like a political party.” In much of AAP rhetoric, a self-righteous anger reverberates
at the fact that politics in India seems to refuse to be remade in the self-image of
the middle class, imagined as the value embodiment of “normal,” “good” capital‐
ism—the rhetoric often exhibits perfectly the shift from “nation building to nation
branding” that post-reform India seems to have been going through (Kaur 2012).
Srirupa Roy’s ethnographic work on the party building of the AAP in Delhi com‐
plements this picture and sketches a strongly “middle-class” proﬁle of party work‐  
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ers. According to Roy, the success of the AAP in its initial stage has relied on “of‐
fering tens of thousands of individuals with spaces and opportunities to establish
their uniqueness or distinction as effective, and new, political subjects” (2014: 50).
AAP activism offers a great opportunity for the many readers of popular-science
economics books in India to practice their imagined managerial/CEO selves: party
workers use meetings to exhort business management maxims and practice their
“management speak” in discussing public expenditure overviews (Roy 2014: 50). A
deeply  engrained practicality  also  pervades  here,  and direct  “problem solving”
simply through educating people on their legal rights or reviving defunct demo‐
cratic mechanisms is believed to provide simple solutions to complex problems
(Roy 2014: 48ff). AAP candidates, moreover, are likely to engage in what Roy calls
“performances  of  political  reluctance and renunciation”—the continued ethical
and principled distancing from “dirty politics” (2014: 50). That the “middle class”
has an advantage here is obvious as the way the principled—as opposed to “op‐
portunistic”—nature of AAP activism is emphasized by narrating the wealthy back‐
ground of AAP activists that allows for sacriﬁce in the ﬁrst place. The upper-caste
advantage is also obvious: as with Anna Hazare’s symbolic fast, the ritualized, en‐
nobling  “sacriﬁce”  can  only  really  be  made  by  someone  who  embodies  up‐
per-caste conﬁdence and purity (Blom Hansen 2014).
This “middle-class” set of practices and values strongly determined the AAP at the
moment it started campaigning for the 2012 Delhi elections and had the passing
of the anticorruption Ombudsman bill as its overriding priority. As Matthew Jenk‐
ins (2014) argues, self-proclaimed a-political anticorruption narratives have his‐
torically been important elements in political struggle in India, but with the con‐
solidation of  a  neoliberal  conception of  corruption,  today’s  anticorruption dis‐
course is dominated by a middle-class politics of discrediting the political class
and  the  poor.  The  AAP’s  emphasis  on  anticorruption  today  hence  potentially
aligns it particularly with the professional middle class. In time, the AAP has, how‐
ever, gone through a similar transformation as that of Parivartan, the Delhi-based
civic association that Arvind Kejriwal founded in 2000 with a group of retired pro‐
fessionals and civil servants. As Rob Jenkins (2007) points out, Parivartan originally
focused on quintessentially “middle-class” issues, its ﬁrst campaign targeting cor‐
ruption in the income-tax bureaucracy: a campaign to help the relatively wealthy
deal  with  the  bribes  they  were  asked  to  pay  by  tax  oﬃcials  by  mobilizing
well-connected friends within the tax  department.  Within  two years,  however,
Parivartan started to address issues of more widespread concern, notably the cor‐
ruption-induced problems within Delhi’s municipal electricity grid (Jenkins 2007:
63). Parivartan gradually formed its approach to using the Freedom of Information  
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Act and other oﬃcial-redress mechanisms to combat police harassment of street
vendors,  illegal  slum-clearance drives,  and irregularities in the supply of subsi‐
dized food.
Similarly, the AAP soon realized that the Ombudsman bill and the moral-ethical
posturing of its leadership were not speaking to the many poor and lower-caste
people whom the AAP also claimed to represent and whose votes it sought. Kan‐
cha Illaiah, a prominent lower-caste intellectual, for instance, publicly mocked the
AAP’s election symbol of the broom (jhadoo), enthusiastically brandished by AAP
supporters to “sweep away corruption,” writing that was ironic to see “men who
would certainly not like to be seen wielding jhadoos at home, brandishing brooms
in public like trophies” (2014). That ethical vigilance could get badly out of hand,
moreover, became clear when Kejriwal’s law minister in January 2014, together
with a mob of AAP supporters, raided the homes of African women suspected of
prostitution  in  protest  at  the  local  police  inaction—indeed  “sexual  corruption”
—despite complaints from residents (see Baxi 2014). This backﬁred as many liberal
and leftist erstwhile sympathizers of the AAP interpreted it as a xenophobic and
potentially fascist act. The AAP leadership seems to have realized that it could get
a much broader appeal by concentrating on its promise to halve electricity bills,
especially for those using only little electricity, and to provide a daily quota of free
water—two major costs of living that the poor struggle with in Delhi. Arvind Kejri‐
wal’s  principled  resignation as  chief  minister  of  Delhi  after  forty-eight  days  in
power,  as it  became clear the Ombudsman bill  would not be passed any time
soon, was still mostly catering to “middle-class” values, but it backﬁred on both
fronts: ﬁrst because it was easily interpreted by the “middle class” as an electoral
strategy (eyeing the upcoming national elections) and hence dirty politics after all,
but perhaps, more importantly, because the slum dwellers of Delhi who had deliv‐
ered AAP its electoral victory (see Ramani 2013) were much more interested in
having the AAP in power to continue delivering subsidized water and electricity
than they were in the Ombudsman bill.
The people’’s movement trajjectory
Hence though the AAP started off in a “middle-class” vein, it soon realized that to
broaden its constituency and spread beyond Delhi’s middle class, it would also
need to include a different section of the Indian population—a section that might
sometimes like to think of itself part of the “middle class” but experiences enough
daily forms of social and economic exclusion for this fantasy to remain extremely
fragile (Zabiliute 2014b). It became useful then for the AAP to posit the “common
man” identiﬁcation less as a distinction from the corrupt handful of “high-worth 
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Indians living in poverty. For accompanying India’s 9 percent average growth rate
in the 1990s is the fact that income inequalities in India have doubled in the liber‐
alization era (Jayadev et. al 2007) and the 60 percent poorest of the Indian popu‐
lation in fact consume almost as much—or we should say as little—today as they
did at the beginning of the 1990s (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2012). Many rural
poor have migrated to urban India in pursuit of a better future only to ﬁnd it im‐
possible to get a steady foothold in the city: much of India’s neoliberal growth is
jobless, relying on accumulation by dispossession. Partha Chatterjee (2008) has
characterized the changed relationship between India’s poor and the state by ar‐
guing that where earlier the political hegemony of the Indian state rested on its
claims to being the vanguard of an enlightened, modern project of national devel‐
opment—with combating poverty being the most important legitimation for in‐
dustrialization—nowadays,  instead,  political  hegemony has  shifted  so  that  it  is
now legitimate for the state to prioritize growth above all. And yet a barrage of
welfare programs has also emerged in the past two decades to try to “reverse the
effects of primitive accumulation” (Chatterjee 2008). In other words, the poor in
India are no longer the legitimation of national economic policymaking but in‐
stead are being managed through increasingly technologically savvy (but hardly
thereby more effective) welfare programs on anything from the right to food to
access to medical insurance. The largest and most famous of the schemes is the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act that the Congress government intro‐
duced in 2005, partly in an attempt to stem the migration of the poor to the cities.
These schemes in themselves, though they can obviously be read as neoliberal
policymaking, have not simply sprang up as an automatic function of a capitalist
system trying to stabilize itself: they have been shaped by the social movements
pushing for them, and have often thereby gotten a more radical or generous con‐
tent than they otherwise would have. Since 1992, the National Alliance of People’s
Movements (NAPM) has brought together many of these social movements. What
is  interesting  is  that  this  alliance—under  the  leadership  of  Medha  Patkar,  well
known for heading the resistance against the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada
River—decided in a meeting with AAP representatives in January 2014 to lend its
“active support” to the party. Moreover, some prominent leaders of movements
who are part of the NAPM, notably Medha Patkar herself and Babu Mathews, for‐
mer director of ActionAid and a well-known labor activist, even took the step of
becoming AAP candidates themselves. The move should be read against the back‐
ground of longer-term dynamics in the ﬁeld of social movements in India—and
elsewhere in the global South—where many of the people’s movements of the
late 1960s and early 1970s had by the 1980s either totally radicalized into armed  
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resistance  (n.b.  the  Maoists)  or  sustained  themselves  with  international  donor
funding. The latter path usually entailed becoming either NGO-ized or at least
maintaining a parallel NGO identity and shifting between the people’s movement
and NGO form according to political and legal contextual requirements. This de‐
velopment  has  also  gone  accompanied  with  a  juridiﬁcation  of  protest  where
NGOs-cum-people’s movements concentrated a lot of their energy on ﬁghting
court battles and pushing for new laws—including new laws enabling more effec‐
tive legal activism such as the Right to Information Act.
In the 2000s, a key process in the NGO ﬁeld became the decrease in international
donor funding, as with India’s “emerging market” status, the Indian state increas‐
ingly wants to be known solely as a “trade partner” and not as a recipient of aid. In
2003, a number of smaller European donors—the Netherlands and Denmark, for
instance—were “relieved” of their role in India (see de Groot et al. 2008), and the
decrease of funding became drastically  felt  by the NGOs-cum-people’s  move‐
ments. Many of their leaders have therefore developed political ambitions to se‐
cure an alternative source of legal survival and potential resource mobilization.
Many now consider it crucial to have a foothold in politics to protect their move‐
ment. And as the momentum of the alter-globalist movement waned, arguments
against entering politics came to be seen as misguided or even hypocritical. This is
the context in which NAPM in 2004 announced the creation of the People’s Politi‐
cal Front (PPF). And this is also the context in which the many personal initiatives
of movement leaders to engage with politics should be read, including, for in‐
stance, Christina Swamy—the former NGO program coordinator I knew from my
ﬁeldwork—who in April 2006 formed the Women’s Political Front in Tamil Nadu to
channel her feminist and antimaﬁa activism toward “an alternative political force
that could replace the male-dominated, corrupt political system.”
The ideological justiﬁcation for the creation of the PPF resonates a lot with the
claims of the AAP today. Already in 2004, Medha Patkar emphasized the perva‐
siveness of corruption and the corporate sponsorship of electoral politics—“with
big industrial houses ﬁnancing and controlling parties”—as a key problem prompt‐
ing the people’s movements to present an alternative. The PPF aimed to “chal‐
lenge the changed culture of politics that is criminal and communal to a large ex‐
tent, which brings not just religion but caste as a force, to carry on the game of
numbers” (Patkar 2004).  Against such opportunistic manipulation, Patkar advo‐
cated the “values, sincerity, and commitment” of the people’s movements, just as
today the AAP juxtaposes its ethical commitment with the corrupt “vote-banking”
of the political class. Of course, there is a thin line between effectively rejecting 
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and the AAP and the NAPM have therefore received similar critiques from Dalit ac‐
tivists.  The  point  I  want  to  make though is  that  Patkar’s  backing of  the  Anna
Hazare movement—and later the AAP—is not all  that surprising and, moreover,
cannot be read as a story of naïve co-optation or selling out on the part of the
NAPM. Instead, it is the joining of two political currents that already had strong
similarities, although the NAPM was more decidedly leftist than the AAP and, in
negotiating the terms of the cooperation, pushed the AAP to the left.
The leftist orientation of the NAPM leadership follows its Marxist-inspired political
education in the late ’60s and ’70s and the fact that these leaders, though usually
not of poor or lower-caste background themselves, have built their legitimacy and
power through the struggles of the poor that they managed to mobilize and that
they represent. Their personal power and discourse is markedly different from that
of the managerial-cum-moralistic party builders of the “middle-class” ideological
stream within the AAP. This is not to say they are altogether Gramscian “organic
intellectuals,” but their attitude toward the ordinary people they try to mobilize is
one of trying to educate them about the structural power relations impeding on
their lives and the need to stand united against them—it goes much beyond the
neoliberal effort of merely educating poor people on the simple practical or be‐
havioral solutions that stand in between their current condition and their entry
into the middle class. These movement leaders wouldn’t be what they are, more‐
over, if they didn’t have a tactical vision and the ability to negotiate political out‐
comes. Swamy described the decision of the NAPM to support the AAP as a care‐
fully negotiated process that the activists entered into with the clear understand‐
ing that they would only agree if the concerns of India’s poor—and not just “cor‐
ruption”—would be a determining factor in the AAP’s political priorities: “Arvind
[Kejriwal] came and we had many questions: is this going to be only about corrup‐
tion, or is this also a people’s struggle?” When the AAP leadership agreed to their
terms, however, they decided “yes, we will join in initiating this new party,” in the
hope that joining their strengths—the visibility and urban appeal of India Against
Corruption leaders with the experience and rural grounding of the NAPM leaders
—would allow for an effective change of the political system in favor of India’s
poor. In interviews with the media, Patkar (Koppikar 2014) likewise described the
AAP as a medium to get political traction for the agenda of the marginalized and
dispossessed and emphasized that, despite the AAP’s public middle-class orienta‐
tion, PPF activists had been active in drawing up the substance of the AAP’s vision
and policy documents.
Concludiing reﬂectiions 
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will conclude with two reﬂections: one concerning what the effect will be on the
AAP, the other concerning the meaning of this involvement in light of Indian poli‐
tics in general. As for the ﬁrst question, the AAP clearly seems to have been mov‐
ing leftward since its inception, and the fact that it reached out to include people’s
movements is both a reﬂection and strengthening of this trend. Though it  still
caters rhetorically to the middle class, the AAP makes sure to set this middle class
off against the corrupt super-elite rather than against a whole gamut of “corrupt”
players that would potentially  include the informal poor.  At  the same time,  its
campaigns consistently and prominently include the bread and butter issues that
are of greatest concern to the poor. Deciding whether this populist mix of mid‐
dle-class rhetoric and concern for the interests of the excluded and dispossessed
of neoliberal India effectively constitutes a nascent emancipatory, counterhege‐
monic force is diﬃcult, but in this light it is perhaps encouraging to see that the
Mumbai stock market tends to register AAP popularity as a threat: whereas the
Mumbai stock market “sizzled,” as newspapers headlines put it, when Modi came
to  power,  it  tends  to  drop  dramatically  when  electoral  victories  of  the  AAP
threaten and “the Common Man takes on India’s elite,” as a Financial Times head‐
line put it. The nervousness of the power block behind India’s neoliberal growth
path can also be seen in measures taken against the AAP by Mukesh Ambani, the
richest man of India and—as we saw in the introduction—a popular target of AAP
campaigns. Since Modi’s election, this owner of much of India’s telecommunica‐
tion and media networks has gained further inﬂuence and uses this to instruct
media channels to ignore the AAP in their coverage. This attempted corporate
media censure could be another sign that the AAP is indeed a potential threat to
the brutality of accumulation by dispossession in India and could even constitute
a blessing in disguise for those committed to pushing the AAP further leftward as
media censure may wane the AAP leadership of its search for spectacular mid‐
dle-class media attention and strengthen its efforts to reach the poor majority.
Unfortunately,  I  cannot,  however,  end on this  positive note regarding the AAP
without also putting this conclusion into perspective by asking what these dy‐
namics within the AAP mean in light of the emancipatory/countercapitalist poten‐
tial in Indian politics in general today. First of all, ironically, the AAP’s leftward shift
has in the short term probably contributed to the growing political hegemony of
the right in India: seen in purely electoral terms, the fact that the AAP shifted left‐
ward meant many of the middle-class sympathizers who would have earlier voted
for  it  ended up  voting  for  the  Bharatiya  Janata  Party  (BJP)  instead  (Hensman
2014), supporting Modi’s electoral victory in the competition for the most effec‐
tive and least corruptible CEO-style prime minister (Bobbio 2013). Moreover, if we  
Luisa Steur: Trajectories of the Common Man’s Party #Focaa... http://www.focaalblog.com/2014/11/03/luisa-steur-trajectories...
10 of 13 20/05/15 10:15
think of these issues beyond electoral calculation, more in terms of political hege‐
mony, we may reach some even more disturbing conclusions.  For with Modi’s
hold on power—his active reshaping of media discourse and aggressive crack‐
down on the left, and the poor in general, in the name of combating Maoist ter‐
ror—the populism of the AAP may end up being the only critical discourse still
possible at all. This possibility can be seen also in the fact that in some regions, ex‐
plicit anticapitalist activists, including Maoists, feel their only chance of political
survival is to join the AAP even if they feel alienated by its populism. This would
mean the populist limits of the AAP’s critique of Indian politics and society will be‐
come the limits of political discourse in general. It means that poverty can only be
articulated as a failure of government “service delivery” and that dispossession is
an outcome of “crony capitalism,” a perversion of an otherwise good capitalism. In
India today there exist structural conditions that favor a populist politics over con‐
scious forms of class struggle as labor has become increasingly fragmented, dis‐
persed, and further informalized and as people use “a precarious mix of livelihood
strategies to make ends meet” (Corbridge and Shah 2013). In this context, it is all
the more understandable that leftist activists feel the need to engage with pop‐
ulist politics. The turn to subvert an initially right-wing populism for leftist pur‐
poses within the AAP simultaneously,  however,  represents a  further right-wing
hegemonization of Indian politics in general.
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University of Copenhagen and Managing Editor of Focaal – Journal of Global and
Historical Anthropology. Her research interests include class and identity politics
in Kerala, India, as well as Cuba. From September 2014 to January 2015, she is
conducting ﬁeldwork in Havana.
 
References
Baxi, Pratiksha. 2014. “The politics of raid governance—Aam Aurat v. Khas Aurat,” Kaﬁla blog, January
25.
Bobbio, Tommaso. 2013. Never-ending Modi: Hindutva and Gujarati neoliberalism as prelude to
all-India premiership? Focaal – Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 67: 123–134.
Chakrabarti, Anjan, and Anup Dhar. 2014. “India and the politics of ‘corruption.’” Philosophers for
Change, February 4.
Chandrasekhar, C. P., and Jayati Ghosh. 2012. Consumption inequality in India. The Hindu, June 25.
 
 
Luisa Steur: Trajectories of the Common Man’s Party #Focaa... http://www.focaalblog.com/2014/11/03/luisa-steur-trajectories...
11 of 13 20/05/15 10:15
Chatterjee, Partha. 2008. Democracy and economic transformation in India. Economic and Political
Weekly 43(16): 53–62.
Chatterjee, Partha. 2011. “Against corruption = against politics,” Kaﬁla blog, August 28.
Corbridge, Stuart, and Alpa Shah. 2013. Introduction: The underbelly of the Indian boom. Economy
and Society 42(3): 335–347.
de Groot, Albert, et al. 2008. Managing aid exit and transformation: India country case study. Sida,
Netherland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida, and Norad.
Giri, Saroj. 2014. “India: Why the Aam Aadmi Party needs a small lesson in Marxism,” Democracy and
Class Struggle blog, April 5.
Hansen, Thomas Blom. 2014. The sacriﬁcial self—recasting renunciation in South Asia. Public lecture
delivered at University of Copenhagen, March 21.
Hensman, Rohini. 2014. 2014 Elections, a secular united front and the Aam Aadmi Party. Economic
and Political Weekly 49(8).
Illaiah, Kancha. 2014. Missing the Aurat in AAP. New Age Islam, January 15.
Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. India’s silent revolution: The rise of the lower castes in north India. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Jayadev, Arjun, Sripad Motiram, and Vamsi Vakulabharanam. 2007. Patterns of wealth disparities in
India during the era of liberalization. Economic and Political Weekly 42(38): 3853–63.
Jenkins, Matthew. 2014. Anna Hazare, liberalisation and the careers of corruption in modern India:
1974–2011. Economic and Political Weekly 49(33): 41–49.
Jenkins, Rob. 2007. Civil society versus corruption. Journal of Democracy 18(2): 55–69.
Kalb, Don. 2014. Class: The urban commons and the empty sign of “the middle class” in the
twenty-ﬁrst century. In Donald M. Nonini, ed., A companion to urban anthropology, pp. 220–249.
Oxford: Wily-Blackwell.
Kaur, Ravinder. 2012. Nation’s two bodies: Rethinking the idea of “new” India and its other. Third
World Quarterly 33(4): 603–621.
Khandekar, Aalok, and Deepa Reddy. 2013. An Indian summer: Corruption, class and the Lokpal
protests. Journal of Consumer Culture. Published online August 13.
Koppikar, Smruti. 2014. Medha Patkar’s best bet yet: The Aam Aadmi party. Hindustan Times, January
16.
Menon, Nivedita, and Aditya Nigam. 2011. “If only there were no people, democracy would be ﬁne…”,
Kaﬁla blog, August 22.
Nigam, Aditya. 2014. “AAP and the ideology warriors,” Kaﬁla blog, January 11.
 
 
Luisa Steur: Trajectories of the Common Man’s Party #Focaa... http://www.focaalblog.com/2014/11/03/luisa-steur-trajectories...
12 of 13 20/05/15 10:15
Patnaik, Prabhat. 2014. A disturbing phenomenon. Frontline, January 24.
Ramani, Srinivasan. 2013. The Aam Aadmi Party’s win in Delhi: Dissecting it through geographical
information systems. Economic and Political Weekly 48(52).
Roy, Arundhati. 2012. Capitalism: A ghost story. Outlook, March 26.
Roy, Srirupa. 2014. Being the change: The Aam Aadmi party and the politics of the extraordinary in
Indian democracy. Economic and Political Weekly 49(15): 45–54.
Sharma, Aradhana. 2012. “Finding women among ‘common men,’” Kaﬁla blog, December 12.
Singh, Puninder. 2014. “History and idealism in the Aam Aadmi Party’s 2014 victories in Punjab,” Kaﬁla
blog, May 29.
Sonpimple, Rahul. 2014. Aam Aadmi and Dalits. Countercurrents, February 8.
Visvanathan, Shiv. 2014. The future and AAP. The Hindu, April 16.
Zabiliute, Emilija. 2014a. Delhi Assembly elections, daru and politisation of violence against women.
Feminist Review 107: 90–97.
Zabiliute, Emilija. 2014b. Going to a mall, disguising the slum: Experiences of the “World Class City”
among urban poor young males. Paper presented at the “Inequality, subalternity and capitalist
development in contemporary South Asia” panel at the European Conference on South Asia Studies,
University of Zurich, Switzerland, July 23–26.
Cite as: Steur, Luisa. 2014. “Trajectories of the Common Man’s Party,” FocaalBlog,
November 3, www.focaalblog.com/luisa-steur-trajectories-of-the-common-
mans-party.
Tags: Aam Aadmi Party, corruption, Indian democracy, Luisa Steur, National
Alliance of People's Movements, NGOs, populism
 
 
Luisa Steur: Trajectories of the Common Man’s Party #Focaa... http://www.focaalblog.com/2014/11/03/luisa-steur-trajectories...
13 of 13 20/05/15 10:15
